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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS: REGULATING EMPLOYEE
SOLICITATION
ChristineM. Westphal*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Massachusetts considered legislation to regulate non-compete
clauses in employment contracts.' The proponents of this legislation are
considering this option because of the belief that non-compete clauses have
been acting as a restraint on high tech start-ups. 2 The argument is that
California, which has legislatively banned the enforcement of non-compete
causes in employment contracts, has continued to be an incubator for high
tech start ups while Massachusetts has seen its once vibrant technology
industry fade. Non-compete clauses are seen as preventing high tech
workers with innovative ideas from striking out on their own to initiate the
next generation of innovative tech companies.3 The proposed legislation
will prevent employers from including non-compete clauses in the
employment contracts of employees making less than $100,000 per year;
require specific levels of non-salary compensation in order to make the noncompete clause binding; and severely limit the time and geographic scope
of the clauses by presuming that any clause beyond the stated parameters in
the legislation is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable under
Massachusetts common law.4 Finally, the legislation seeks to prevent
employers from restraining their employees from being employed by
competing firms, eliminating claims under the inevitable disclosure

* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University, Boston, MA.
1. H. 1974, 186th Leg. (Mass. 2009); H. 1799, 186th Leg., (Mass. 2009).
2. See Christine M. O'Malley, Note, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech
Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1215, 1239 (1999); see generally
Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and Non-Competition Laws Obstruct
Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L. J. 323 (2006).
3. Scott Kirsner, Non-Compete Clauses May Be Making Us Non-Competitive, THE BOSTON GLOBE

(Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/01/19/non-compete
be making-usnoncompetitive.
4. H. 1974, 186th Leg. (Mass. 2009); H. 1799, 186th Leg. (Mass. 2009).
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doctrine (which states that employees who are privy to trade secrets will
inevitably disclose them to their new employer and therefore should be
restrained from employment by a competitor).5
While this legislation may increase employee mobility, it does not
address the problem of covenants not to solicit employees, which it
specifically leaves unchanged. The failure to address the issue of nonsolicitation of employee clauses is problematic for two reasons. First, it
keeps the legislation from accomplishing its main goal of making
Massachusetts competitive with the West Coast as an incubator for startups. Second, as employers realize they can no longer enforce non-competes,
they may then try to restrain employee mobility by enforcing nonsolicitation of employee clauses. As one commentator on the proposed
Massachusetts legislation summarized the situation, " [on the West Coast,
talent is more fluid. Good people gravitate toward good ideas and bring
along other good people with whom they have worked in the past. This
greatly increases a company's chances of success." 6
Employment mobility is an increasingly important public policy issue;
with the American economy in transition, the average employee expects to
have both multiple employers and multiple career tracks. Legislatures can
attempt to increase business activity in their respective states by
encouraging innovation through increased employee mobility, or they can
attempt to limit employee mobility to appear business friendly. The Georgia
Legislature opted for a 'business friendly' solution placing an amendment
to the Georgia constitution on the November 2010 ballot to help clarify
restrictive covenants and limit employee mobility. The amendment passed
in a "a landslide victory," garnering 68% of the vote.7 The constitutional
amendment ratified previously approved legislation8 designed to constrain
competition and employee mobility.9 Georgia hopes that the new law will
help attract existing businesses from other states.10 In the northeast, states
have historically relied on technical innovation to increase business activity.

5. For additional information on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, see Matthew K. Miller,
Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition Agreement Exists: Additional Guidance Needed, 6 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 240 (2000).
6. Kirsner, supra note 3.
7. Joanne Deschenaux, New Day Dawnsfor GeorgiaNoncompete Law, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. (NOv. 5,2010),
http:/ /www.shrm.org/Legallssues/StateandLocalResources/Pages/NewDayDawns.aspx.
8. H.B. 173, 150th Leg. (Ga. 2009).
9. A. Robert Fischer, Conrad S. Kee, C. Todd Vand Dyke, Jackson Lewis LLP, Georgia Passes
New Law That May Enhance Enforceabilityof Noncompete Agreements, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. (May 11, 2009),
http://www.shrm.org/Legallssues/StateandLocalResources/Pages/GeorgiaEnforceabilityofNonc
ompete.aspx.
10. Diane Cadrain, Lawmakers Examine Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts,SOC'Y FOR
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.shrm.org/Legallssues/StateandLocalResouTces/Pages/LawmakersExamineRestrictiv
eCovenantsinEmploymentContracts.aspx.
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Accordingly, the proposed Massachusetts legislation was designed to
increase employee mobility and encourage technical innovation.
Non-solicitation of employee clauses have rarely been enforced in the
past and there is no Massachusetts case law on the subject. However, such
clauses have been litigated in California (where the enforcement of noncompetes has been barred by legislation) as well as several other states. The
case law on both non-compete clauses and non-solicitation of employee
clauses has sought to balance the legitimate business needs of the employer
against the employee's right to seek the most advantageous employment
situation.
This Article will provide a brief introduction to restrictive covenants in
employment contracts; outline the reasons that non-solicitation of employee
clauses have been included in employment contracts; and review several
significant court decisions on non-solicitation of employee clauses. It
concludes that if other states consider legislation that affects restrictive
covenants they should include non-solicitation of employee clauses in both
the discussion of non-compete clauses and any other legislative initiatives
that address employee mobility.
II. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

The introduction of the guild system in Europe was probably the first
organized effort by businesses to limit their competition, keep their
employees from seeking other opportunities, and protect their trade secrets
from disclosure. As the industrial age progressed, the guilds gave way to a
more modem system of commerce, but the instinctive desire to protect a
business from competition, loss of trade secrets, and the loss of employees
remained. In the modern age businesses have used restrictive employment
covenants to achieve these goals. Courts have been asked to balance the
needs of the modern industrial society, employers and employees when
interpreting these contacts; and legislatures have wrestled with how to
preserve the advantages of competition, provide the opportunity for
workers to sell their labor to their best advantage, and still appear business
friendly.
"[R]estrictive covenants generally span four different areas: (1) general
non-competition; (2) customer (or client) non-solicitation; (3) employee nonsolicitation; and (4) non-disclosure."1 1 When interpreting these covenants,
courts will enforce them if they are reasonable. "[R]easonableness is
measured by its hardship to the employee, its effect upon the general
public, and the reasonableness of the time, territory, and activity
restrictions."1 2 In addition, courts will consider whether the employer has a

11. Kenneth J.Vanko, "You're Fired!And Don't Forget Your Non-Compete...": The Enforceabilityof
Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL Bus. &COM. L. J.1, 2 (2002).
12. Arpac Corp. v. Murray, 589 N.E.2d 640, 649 (111.App. 1992).
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"legitimate business interest" and if the covenants are drawn narrowly
enough to protect that interest while putting the least burden on the
employee and the general public, which as a matter of public policy has an
interest in free competition. Courts will also consider whether the restrictive
covenant seeks to limit the former employee in specific "activities"
(described as an activity covenant) or seeks to eliminate competition. 13
Customer non-solicitation and non-disclosure covenants are generally
viewed as activity covenants and it is easier for the courts to find that
businesses have a legitimate business interest in their customer lists and
trade secrets, so courts are more likely to uphold those restrictive covenants.
Non-competition clauses are much more likely to be viewed as limiting
competition, so courts are reluctant to enforce them. However, the usual
method of enforcing non-competition clauses is through injunctive relief,
and courts have wide discretion in both issuing injunctive relief and
modifying non-competition clauses so that they meet the reasonableness
standard necessary to be enforceable. The uncertainty caused by wide
judicial discretion in enforcement, combined with the high cost of litigation,
has a chilling effect on employers who seek to hire a new employee who has
signed a non-competition agreement with his or her former employer.1 4
While there is a substantial body of case law and commentary on noncompetition clauses, an extensive discussion of these is beyond the scope of
this article.15 However, it is worth noting that non-competition covenants
are becoming both less popular and less enforceable as both courts and
legislatures seek to narrow their scope.16
Although they have not been extensively litigated, non-solicitation of
employee clauses have been viewed both as activity covenants17 and as
generally anti-competitive. 8 Based on the experience in California, which
has seen an increase in litigation around non-solicitation of employee cases
since it restricted non-competition covenants, it seems likely that as noncompetition clauses continue to fall out of favor, employers will rely more
on non-solicitation of employee clauses to limit employee mobility.
III. REASONS TO PROHIBIT SOLICITATION OF EMPLOYEES
Firms hire away the employees of other firms for many reasons. To find
a potential employee with both skills and experience, one would look to

13. Id.
14. See Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which Types of Restrictive
Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 453 (2006).
15. See David A. Goodof, Massachusetts Covenants Not to Compete in an Era of Employment
Uncertainty, 38 Bus. L. REV. 25, 26 (2005); Vanko, supra note 11; M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete

Contracts: Understandingthe Costs of Unpredictability,10 TEX. WEsLEYAN L. REV. 137 (2003).
16. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 673 (2008).
17. See Arpac, 589 N.E.2d at 649.
18. Schmersahl v. McHugh, 28 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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other firms, often in the same line of business. Hiring away individual
employees with the knowledge, skills, and experience a firm needs is a
common business practice. Yet it is a practice that is limited to allow a
former employer to protect trade secrets and confidentiality, even if there is
no employment contract. Common law causes of action for disclosure of
trade secrets and confidential information are longstanding and well known
features of the business environment. But when firms hire away two or
more employees from another firm in a short time span, it is often
considered an attack on the other firm's human capital.19 Such attacks are
characterized in a number of ways; the terms "poaching," "pirating," or
"raiding" have all been used to describe the process. For the purposes of
this article, it will be referred to as "corporate raiding."
Corporate raiding is considerably more problematic for firms than
losing a single employee; it can disrupt business plans, significantly delay
projects and products, weaken the competitive abilities of the firm under
"attack," and ultimately cost a great deal of time and money. 20 Corporate
raiding is especially popular in the financial sector and high tech industries,
but it can happen in any business environment from publishing 2' to shrink
wrap packaging 22 to car saleS23 to hotels. 24 Where it is designed specifically
to weaken a competitor, courts will consider corporate raiding unfair
competition. When one employee arranges for a group of fellow employees
to all leave at the same time it is often considered a breach of fiduciary
duty25 or a breach of the duty of good faith.26 When there is no employment
contract, firms can bring common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and/or breach of the duty of loyalty as well as anti-trust claims for unfair
competition, but such suits are expensive and time consuming. 27 Even if a
firm "wins" it can be irreparably harmed.8
Firms raid other companies for employees because it is much easier to
assemble a workforce if you simply move a whole collection of skilled
employees into place, and it is much easier to hire people whose skills and
abilities are known and who can work together comfortably. It is also easier
to entice away customers and lines of business when you take a group of a
competitor's employees. When a firm is damaged in this way, it is much
more likely to respond by suing, although that may not be the best course of
19. Timothy M. Gardner, Interfirm Competition for Human Resources: Evidence from the Software
Industry, 48 AcAD. MGMT. J.237,238 (2005).
20. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Ct. App. 1985).
21. Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1966).
22. Arpac, 589 N.E.2d at 644.
23. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, 707 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Michael S. Rosenwald, Instead of Zen Dens, Starwood Builds an Espionage Case Against Hilton,
WASH. POST, June 13, 2009, at A10.
25. Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at 934.
26. Jim Middlemiss, Ruling to Affect Brokerages; Court Findsfor RBC, FIN. POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at
FP2.
27. Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at 936.
28. Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. 836.
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action. In most instances, a firm would prefer to avoid the corporate raid
and subsequent litigation by simply keeping its employees.
Firms can take a number of prophylactic actions in order to avoid
corporate raids: they can ensure that their wages and working conditions
are competitive; require their employees to notify them when they are
discussing employment offers with specific competitors; and include nonsolicitation of employee clauses in employment contracts. While none of
these actions is guaranteed to work, firms are increasingly relying on nonsolicitation of employee clauses because they are more likely to discourage
solicitation of employees (the present employee might not be familiar with
common law causes of action but they have hopefully read their contracts).
It is often possible to seek injunctive relief that will allow the firm time to
recover and perhaps keep their customers and lines of business. 29 Firms
may also be better able to obtain damage awards. However, courts have not
been consistent in interpreting these clauses and firms might be better off if
they focus their energies on non-solicitation of customers and protection of
their trade secrets and confidential information. Restrictive covenants in
employment contracts that seek to protect trade secrets and confidential
information are easier to enforce, while holding on to employees who wish
to leave is likely to have negative consequences for the organization.
IV. SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS

As noted above, there has not been a great deal of reported litigation on
non-solicitation of employee clauses in employment contracts. Those cases
that have been decided tend to focus on whether there was a legitimate
business interest to protect and whether the contract was sufficiently
narrow in scope to meet the reasonableness standard used to evaluate
restrictive covenants. Only one court has rejected covenants not to solicit
employees as a matter of public policy.
In Schmersahl v. McHugh the Missouri Court of Appeals was presented
with a case in which Tim McHugh, the former employee of an accounting
firm, had signed an employment contract with restrictive covenants that
covered a three year period, including a non-solicitation of employees
clause. 30 McHugh mentioned to a former colleague that there was an
opening at his new firm during a lunch meeting eighteen months after he
left.31 His old firm, Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., sued seeking to recover
liquidated and actual damages for breach "of a covenant not to 'solicit,
persuade, induce, or encourage' employer's employees to terminate their

29. See Stephan Gandel, Investment Banks Seek to Lock Up Top Staffers, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 03,
18
2000, at p. ; Peter Brown, Atmel Wins Legal Round in Illegal Solicitation Suit, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Apr.
06, 1998, at p.20.
30. Schmersahl, 28 S.W.3d at 347.
31. Id.
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employment." 32 The Missouri court found that "the covenant restrains trade
and does not fall within the class of restrictive covenants which may be
enforced in Missouri because it is not directed to the protection of trade
secrets or customer contacts."33 The court further held that "an employer's
interest in protecting the stability of its at-will workforce is not one of the
interests that may be protected by a restrictive covenant in Missouri."M It
did observe, however, that if soliciting the employees was designed to
either "destroy another's business" or "misappropriate the employer's trade
secrets" then the conduct would be "culpable."3 5
In contrast, in ARPAC v. Murray the Illinois Appellate Court took the
position that maintaining a stable workforce was a legitimate business
interest and therefore upheld a restrictive covenant that prevented Murray
from "inducing" ARPAC's employees to quit.36 The court looked at
Murray's phone records, and noted that the records indicated that Murray
had not called the two workers that joined his new firm before he left
ARPAC but then called them repeatedly after he left in what the court
characterized as a "flurry of activity."3 7 While the court struck down the
covenant not to compete as "overly broad,"38 they affirmed the lower
court's order enforcing non-solicitation clauses covering ARPAC's
employees and customers.
In Hay v. Bassick the Federal District Court looked at two different
employment contracts that had been entered into by former employees who
were being sued for multiple breaches of restrictive covenants. 39 The
specific non-solicitation of employees language that the court examined
sought to prevent one of the defendants from "soliciting or otherwise
directly attempting to induce any employee of the Hay Group, Inc. or its
affiliates to terminate his or her employment."40 Since the court could find
no legitimate business interest that was being protected by the restrictive
covenant they held that "this restriction is a blanket prohibition on soliciting
any Hay employee, and as such is unenforceable." 41 It is unclear if they
would have enforced the restriction even if it had been tied to a legitimate
business interest because it was so broad that it might have been considered
unreasonable in scope.
Other courts that analyzed restrictive covenants not to solicit employees
by looking for a legitimate business interest have found that investments in

32. Id. at 348.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 351.
35. Id.
36. Arpac, 589 N.E.2d at 650.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 652.
39. Hay Group Inc. v. Bassick, No. 02 C 8194, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22095, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill., Mar.
24, 2008).
40. Id. at *15.
41. Id. at *22.
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"specialized training,"42 confidential information,43 and trade secrets44 are
legitimate business interests. Courts generally will not enforce a restriction
if they cannot find that the covenant is protecting a legitimate business
interest. Several courts have also discussed whether or not information
about employees' salaries and skills are trade secrets without reaching a
direct holding on the issue.45
In Loral Corp v. Moyes, a leading California case, the California Court of
Appeal identified trade secrets as a legitimate business interest in dicta, but
it based its holding in the case on a narrow interpretation of how the
restrictive covenant would be applied. Robert Moyes was President of a
Loral subsidiary who signed a termination agreement which provided for
post employment compensation in return for Moyes promise not to
"disrupt, damage, impair or interfere with the business ... by. . . raiding its

employees." 46 Immediately after he left his position with the Loral
subsidiary he went to work for a competitor and began interviewing and
hiring away key Loral employees. Loral sued arguing that Moyes had
breached the separation agreement. The trial court entered a non-suit after
opening arguments, holding that the separation agreement was null and
void because it constituted a restraint of trade under California Business
and Professional Code section 16600. The California Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court holding that restrictive covenants not to solicit the
employees of a former employer only bar solicitation. The employees of the
former firm are "not hampered from seeking employment" with the new
firm; they are simply losing the option of "being contacted first," and
therefore there is very little restraint on employee mobility. 47 The employee
who leaves first does not experience "significant restraint on his engaging
in his profession, trade or business;" he has simply given up the
opportunity to solicit the employees from his former firm.48 Loral is often
cited for holding that a covenant not to solicit employees of a former
employer only bars solicitation; it does not actually prevent the employee
from being hired.
Finally, many of the court decisions cite Lane v. Taylor in support of the
proposition that a one year contract provision preventing the "pirating" of
employees was not overly broad and was reasonable as to the length of the
restriction.49 The Lane case overturned a lower court's granting of summary
judgment and held that "a jury question was presented concerning the
legitimacy of the need to maintain the confidentiality of the information in

42. See Balasco, 707 So. 2d at 859.
43. See Greystone Staffing v. Goehringer, No. 13906-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Unisys v. Entex
Info. Serv., 45 Pa. D. & C. 4th 405 (C.C.P. Montgomery 2000).
44. Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at 939.
45. Id. at 941; Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
46. Loral Corp., 219 Cal.Rptr. at 840.
47. Id. at 844.
48. Id. at 843.
49. Lane Co. v. Taylor, 330 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
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question."o
V. ANALYSIS
While no state has decided enough cases that specifically deal with nonsolicitation of employee contract provisions to create a cohesive body of law
in the area, several trends have emerged. When facing this issue, courts
seem to apply a balancing test that compares the need for businesses to
protect their legitimate interests with both the burden placed on the former
employees and the perceived restraint on trade. Courts borrow the
reasonableness standards normally applied to restrictive covenants of time,
territory and activity. However, these trends are not sufficiently well
developed to allow attorneys representing businesses to be confident about
how the court in any state (except Missouri) will decide on the
enforceability of restrictive covenants not to solicit employees if it is
challenged.
Courts differ on whether non-solicitation of employee clauses are minor
activity restrictions and generally reasonable,5 ' or broader restraints on
trade and unreasonable. 52 There is also uncertainty about what a court
would consider a legitimate business interest. That uncertainty about what
constitutes a legitimate business interest will only increase as information
about employees, customers and business practices become more widely
available on the internet. Greystone Staffing v. Goehringer illustrates this
premise; the court observed, "customer information is not considered
confidential if it is readily obtainable through public sources." 53 Will firms
whose employees post their resumes online in order to "test the waters"
have the confidentiality of their employee identities, skills, and salaries
destroyed because the information is readily obtainable?
There may also be ambiguity about what constitutes solicitation. Will
courts that only seek to limit "solicitation" find that placing information on
a Facebook page about the benefits of a new employer to be solicitation of
their former employer's workers? In Unisys v. Entex, the court found that
sending an email to fellow employees about a new job offer "which will
afford me a financial opportunity which cannot be found at Unisys"5 and
encouraging those employees to "please stay in touch" constituted
solicitation, but Facebook is arguably a more passive activity. Uncertainty
often results in litigation, and litigation in this area is expensive. In a
Colorado case that dealt with the applications for preliminary injunctions,
the winning party received $75,000 in attorney's fees.55

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 116.
Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
Hay Group, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22095.
Greystone, at *3.
Unisys, 45 Pa. D. &C. 4th at 408.
Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 160 P.3d 347 (Colo. App. 2007).

2011]1

Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts

117

However, firms are going to continue to try to retain their employees
through restrictive covenants because replacing employees that have been
raided by a competitor is so expensive. In Loral, the plaintiff estimated that
it had spent over $400,000 on recruiting new employees to replace those
who had left. 56 The plaintiff did not offer information about costs beyond
recruitment such as training costs for new employees or lost productivity
while they were replacing the employees, so this estimate may be
conservative. The desire to try to protect or preserve both human capital
and the investment in training will provide strong motivation to seek legal
advice on available options and covenants not to solicit employees will
remain an obvious option. The covenants may not be enforceable in all
courts but they will provide at the very least, a chilling effect that may slow
the loss of employees because the potential costs of the litigation are so
high.
VI. CONCLUSION

If courts and legislatures continue to limit the applicability and
usefulness of covenants not to compete, there will be more reliance on
restrictive covenants not to solicit employees and there will be more courts
that focus their decisions on restrictive covenants not to solicit employees.
These covenants may not be enforceable, but they will probably have a
chilling effect on corporate raids of employees and they will adversely
affect employee mobility. This article proposes that it would be better for
legislatures considering restrictions on competition to include nonsolicitation of employee clauses in their considerations because limitations
placed on non-competition clauses by either the courts or legislatures seem
to increase reliance on non-solicitation of employee restraints and any
restrictive covenant that restricts employee mobility raises public policy
issues that the legislative branch should consider.
Attorneys who are trying to help firms limit the loss of employees to
corporate raids should also consider advising them to consider alternate
solutions. Microsoft has apparently tried to limit employee loss by requiring
their employees to notify them when they are talking to another company
about employment opportunities.5 7 Requiring employees to disclose their
negotiations for new employment would also have a chilling effect that
would slow down the loss of employees to other firms and would give the
firm being targeted for a raid an opportunity to compete for the employee.
Attorneys should also focus on emphasizing the protection of trade secrets
and confidential information in employment contracts, both because courts
will more readily enforce non-disclosure covenants and because nondisclosure covenants will provide the legitimate business interest necessary
56. Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
57. Rebecca Buckman, E-Business: New Web Software Start-Up Draws Microsoft Workers - and Its
Ire, WALL ST. J., Sep. 11, 2000, at B1.
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for enforcement of customer non-solicitation clauses.
While there are no easy solutions for companies who are trying to retain
employees, restrictive covenants not to solicit employees will remain a
useful option for business lawyers. If state legislatures want to regulate the
use restrictive covenants in order to improve employee mobility and
encourage entrepreneurial activity, they will need to consider both
covenants not to compete and covenants not to solicit employees.

